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MAKING HEALTH MARKETS WORK BETTER THROUGH 
TARGETED DOSES OF COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND 
COLLABORATION 
LEN M. NICHOLS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Some thoughtful commentators have argued that many health services, 
including insurance, are so unique and vital to the health of so many that 
they should not be bought and sold in markets like other goods and 
services.1  Their judgment is that markets inevitably lead to some—and 
possibly a considerable—degree of rationing by income, at least in the 
context of the United States’ health system until 2014, when the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) is scheduled to be more fully 
implemented.2  Rationing by income is judged to be inherently unjust, since 
life itself, as well as profound differences in the quality of life, are at stake so 
often.  Those who reason this way would largely or completely replace 
market allocation mechanisms with expert allocation mechanisms.3  They 
would turn health professionals into employees of the federal government, 
and “ensure” that all (Americans) get the care they “need” through systems 
 
* Director, Center for Health Policy Research and Ethics, and Professor of Health Policy, 
College of Health and Human Services, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. 
 1. Bruce C. Vladeck, Perspective: Market Realities Meet Balanced Government: Another 
Look At Columbia/HCA, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 37, 39; PNHP Mission Statement, 
PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH PROGRAM, http://www.pnhp.org/about/pnhp-mission-state 
ment (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 126 
(Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996). 
 2. Single-Payer FAQ, PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH PROGRAM, http://www.pnhp.org/ 
facts/single-payer-faq (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); see Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1003-399V-3, 124 Stat. 119, 139, 150, 151, 159, 162, 998 
(2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-94-1395x).  The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), was amended by the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029.  The two preceding laws will be hereinafter cited together as “ACA.” 
 3. PNHP Mission Statement, supra note 1; Single-Payer FAQ, supra note 2. 
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of professionally driven logic, control, and governmental supply, financed 
largely if not exclusively by taxes on the general population.4 
Others argue that the allocation of taxpayer-funded resources by experts 
would inevitably lead to health care rationing by politics, which they view not 
only as inherently unjust, but also un-American and unconstitutional, and 
which at the end of the day is the same thing in their eyes.5  They cannot 
imagine a worse outcome than divorcing the allocation of health resources 
from the marketplace, for they believe consumers have the inalienable right 
to buy what they want with their own money—whether others want to tax it 
away or make them spend it differently [or not].6  They also believe that if 
you cannot afford to buy what you want or need with your own money, you 
have no right to expect those with more means to help you, except through 
voluntary and preferably local charity.7 
As we have (painfully) observed, now twice in twenty years, the epic 
battles over health reform in the United States, based as they are on 
fundamentally different views of the role of government in a democratic 
republic, have led to partisan polarization, apocalyptic rhetoric, and 
genuine fear.8  I write this article not to praise fear, but to bury it, by 
describing how to amend health market rules in such a way as to preserve 
key freedoms and personal choice while improving the distributive justice, 
economic efficiency, and ultimately sustainability of universal access to vital 
health services.  It turns out that health reform and true economic efficiency 
can be complementary.  It also turns out that the ACA provides some, but by 
no means all, of the tools to improve market performance in a host of 
circumstances.  The purpose of this article is to identify these circumstances 
and match them with specific tools.  Although this article cannot reconcile 
those who oppose any collective role in making sure all Americans have 
 
 4. PNHP Mission Statement, supra note 1; Single-Payer FAQ, supra note 2; About CNA, 
CAL. NURSES ASS’N, http://www.nationalnursesunited.org/affiliates/entry/cna-about (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2011). 
 5. Ilya Shapiro, The Individual Mandate: An Unconstitutional Expansion of Federal Power 
(A Reply to Kermit Roosevelt), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2011/09/individual-mandate-unconstitutional-expansion-
federal-power-reply-kermit-roosevelt/; Michael F. Cannon, How Can I Ration Your Medical 
Care?, TOWNHALL MAG., Sept. 2009, at 50, 51-54. 
 6. Cannon, supra note 5, at 52, 54; Michael F. Cannon, A “Right” to Health Care?, 
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 29, 2007, 6:00 AM) [hereinafter Cannon, A “Right” to Health 
Care?], http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/221410/right-health-care/michael-f-cannon. 
 7. Cannon, A “Right” to Health Care?, supra note 6; Leonard Peikoff, Health Care Is 
Not a Right, Address at a Town Hall Meeting on the Clinton Health Plan 1, 2 (Dec. 11, 
1993), available at http://afcm.org/Health-Care-Is-Not-A-Right_(c)-Leonard-Peikoff.pdf. 
 8. Health Care Reform, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/dis 
easesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insurance_and_managed_care/health_care_reform/in
dex. html (last updated Nov. 15, 2011). 
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access to care, I can perhaps show that actual market performance—in 
terms of prices closer to cost and cost growth closer to our limited ability to 
pay—could be substantially improved from wise and more widespread 
applications of market-savvy policy tools. 
I will try to answer four questions: (1) What do we want health markets 
to do?  (2) What are the major barriers to achieving optimal performance?  
(3) Under what conditions can each policy approach (laissez-faire, 
collaboration, regulation) improve current market outcomes?  (4) What 
additional tools, beyond those in the ACA, are desperately needed to get us 
closer to the promised land? 
II.  MARKET DESIDERATA 
The fundamental criterion of economically efficient market performance 
(competitive equilibrium) is for consumers to be willing to pay what they 
have to pay to cover the marginal social cost of producing what the 
consumer wants.  Under conditions that are assumed to prevail in 
competitive markets, this maximizes the value of society’s resource 
allocation.  Technically, economists want price (P) to be driven down to the 
efficient unit cost level (C*), where cost includes a competitive return on the 
minimally necessary capital investment.  This is not the same thing as 
“maximizing the number of competitors,” or creating a “business friendly” 
environment, though that rhetoric is popular and those structural conditions 
may improve market performance if barriers to entry have been high for 
some time.  But if price is neither near nor moving rapidly toward the unit 
cost of efficient providers, something is seriously wrong with market 
performance, regardless of how happy sellers might be.9 
Another signal of allocative efficiency is whether the quantity (q) of 
services is optimal (q*).  This is defined as the quantity where efficient 
marginal cost equals price, where price reflects what a fully informed 
consumer would pay and an efficient provider would require to cover the 
costs of the last unit, i.e., where marginal value equals efficient marginal 
cost.  In the health care context, q* is all the services needed to ensure 
efficacious care for a particular condition and no more. 
Quality (Q) of each unit or of the set of units delivered is typically 
ignored in textbook economics, since it is assumed that producers of the q* 
will naturally supply consumers with the optimal quality (Q*) that they are, 
being fully informed about the marginal value of true quality, willing to pay 
for.  Thus, quality should be supplied to balance value and cost, just like 
quantity. Quality is more complicated than it seems, for part of good quality 
 
 9. See Len M. Nichols et al., Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health 
Care Systems? Confidence Is Waning, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 8, 12. 
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is the correct set of quantities, the q, but quality goes beyond that to include 
patient experience.  It is not just what is done to or with a patient, but how it 
is done, that defines quality health care in the 21st century. 
Finally, in the real world, many people prefer some degree of equity in 
access to health markets, which could be expressed as all (Americans) will 
get minimally necessary q* and Q* to preserve their capacity to work and 
live a normal life.  Support for universal equity is clearly not unanimous, but 
it is real and powerful enough to be highly relevant to practical and policy 
discussions of health market performance. 
III.  HEALTH MARKET REALITIES 
None of these desired outcomes are met in most health markets today.  
Given the margins and cost growth performances that have been observed 
for many years, I infer that market prices are often far above unit costs (P > 
C).10  Technically, this is both because providers are not efficient (C > C*)11 
and because local market power enables many to charge private payers 
(and sometimes government payers) more than C.12  Provider market power 
is amplified when insurers, starting with the largest one for most hospitals 
and physicians—the Medicare program—are compelled by politics, 
tradition, or in the absence of credible information on differential provider 
quality, feel compelled to provide access to practically any willing 
provider.13  Rather than negotiate the more than 10,000 medical service 
prices with approximately 700,000 doctors and 6,000 hospitals, they set 
 
 10. In the understated elegance of Joe Newhouse’s historical explanation of provider 
prices in the U.S. health care system: “Thus, the standard market mechanisms for eliminating 
rents—or prices above average cost—were weak in the market for medical services, and did 
not operate at all in the limiting case of insurance that reimbursed patients in full at the 
margin.”  JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE CONUNDRUM 11 
(2002). 
 11. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, SECTION 3B: 
PHYSICIAN SERVICES 114 (2004); The Overuse, Underuse, and Misuse of Health Care: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 6 (2008) [hereinafter Misuse of Health Care] 
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office). 
 12. Paul B. Ginsburg, Can Hospitals and Physicians Shift the Effects of Cuts in Medicare 
Reimbursement to Private Payers?, HEALTH AFF., w3-472, w3-474, w3-477-78 (Oct. 8, 2003) 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2003/10/08/hlthaff.w3.472.full.pdf; James C. 
Robinson, Hospital Market Concentration, Pricing, and Profitability in Orthopedic Surgery and 
Interventional Cardiology, AM. J. MANAGED CARE, e241, e247 (June 2011), http://www.aj 
mc.com/media/pdf/86aee848e56115f8d8d43711599ce6ef.pdf. 
 13. Robert A. Berenson & Jane Horvath, Confronting The Barriers To Chronic Care 
Management In Medicine, HEALTH AFF., w3-37, w3-42 (Jan. 22, 2003) http://www.healthaff 
airs.org/RWJ/Berenson.pdf; MEDPAC, supra note 11, at 109. 
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administered price schedules that ensure most are willing to participate.14  
This, by definition, means that most prices exceed the reservation price or 
unit cost for most providers.  At the same time, endemic process 
inefficiencies, Medicaid underpayment, and uncompensated care for the 
under- and uninsured, especially for hospitals, keep overall margins low.  
This complex set of facts, which also includes prices a bit higher than costs, 
costs higher than need be, as well as small and variable margins on large 
cash flows, defines the conundrum of incentive realignment in U.S. health 
care. 
Finally, there is quite a bit of evidence that q > q* for many patients and 
conditions.15  Again, technically this is because the incentives for overuse 
are strong: providers make more money from doing more,16 
consumers/patients often face low or zero marginal cost from more and 
more expensive services,17 and fear of malpractice claims18 and anxiety 
about possible maladies leads to far more testing and procedures than 
necessary.19 
While we have some of the best clinicians and hospitals in the world—
and indeed perform very well vis-a-vis the rest of the world in complex 
domains (heart attacks, some surgeries),20—our providers also have highly 
variable skill and knowledge and do a far worse job than many other 
countries’ systems in consistently delivering high quality primary and chronic 
care management.21  This is where most of the money is actually spent and 
most of the health care system’s value-added to population health actually 
 
 14. MEDPAC, supra note 11, at 109; Misuse of Health Care, supra note 11, at 7; BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: PHYSICIANS 
AND SURGEONS 3 (2010-2011 ed. 2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ocos 
074.pdf; Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/apps/physician-fee-schedule/overview.aspx (last updated Sept. 
30, 2011); KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Total Hospitals, 2009, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=382&cat=8 (last visited Oct. 8, 
2011); Data Compendium: 2010 Edition, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/DataCompendium/14_2010_Data_Com 
pendium.asp#TopOfPage (last updated Oct. 27, 2011). 
 15. Misuse of Health Care, supra note 11, at 2, 7. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 7. 
 18. Tara F. Bishop et al., Physicians’ Views on Defensive Medicine: A National Survey, 
170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1081, 1081 (2010). 
 19. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending In The United States And The Rest Of The 
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 910 (2005). 
 20. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2009, at 123, 125, 
129 (2009) [hereinafter OECD]; Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does The Quality Of Care 
Compare In Five Countries?, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2004, at 89, 92. 
 21. See OECD, supra note 20, at 117, 119, 121. 
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occurs.22  This means our average quality is far below what it should be     
(Q < Q*) far too often.23  In addition, our lack of equitable access to care 
exacerbates average quality gaps.24 
More fundamental reasons for suboptimal health market performance 
include the reality that health care is a complex multi-product industry where 
inherent uncertainty is great.  This is the case because humans are not all 
alike, and accurate diagnosis can require very subtle powers of discernment.  
This process is not like buying apples or tomatoes that you can hold and 
evaluate before purchase.  Inherent uncertainty and the contingent nature of 
illness means that even after purchase, many consumers will never know 
how effective the health insurance or health services they purchased actually 
were. 
Furthermore, asymmetric information about health and health care 
services between buyers and sellers means that patients will always depend 
on providers for technical advice and more or less have to trust that 
providers are at all times duty bound to act and advise in the patient’s best 
interest.25  This reality, plus third party payment26—itself a requirement in the 
modern world of potentially catastrophic expenses that can bankrupt all but 
the richest citizens—means that providers are constantly tempted to err on 
the side of more versus fewer services in pursuit of the patient’s “best 
interest,” especially given lingering (if sometimes quantitatively 
exaggerated)27 malpractice concerns.  And as long as fee-for-service 
payment remains the norm, some providers will be sorely tempted to provide 
more services than needed, as any other seller in conditions of asymmetric 
information would be.28  Some providers do resist this temptation.  But there 
is growing evidence that the self-deniers are on the verge of being 
outnumbered in American medicine today,29 even if the primary motivation 
 
 22. U.S. Health Care Costs, KAISEREDU.ORG (March 2010), http://www.kaiseredu.org/ 
Issue-Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx#content6. 
 23. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
2010 NATIONAL HEALTHCARE QUALITY REPORT 2 (2011). 
 24. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED. (IOM), CROSSING THE 
QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 53 (2001). 
 25. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. 
ECON. REV. 941, 949-50 (1963); see Peter J. Hammer et al., Kenneth Arrow and the 
Changing Economics of Health Care: “Why Arrow? Why Now?”, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
835, 836, 841 (2001). 
 26. Arrow, supra note 25, at 962. 
 27. See Anderson et al., supra note 19, at 910, 912. 
 28. See id. at 910. 
 29. See Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare 
Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
273, 276 (2003); Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 
36, 40, 42. 
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is less venal than defensive, and even deeply symbiotic with declining 
professional morale in an era of unmet expectations of autonomy and 
prestige.30 
In other words, asymmetric information and third-party payment leads to 
too many services and too much spending.  In addition, local market power 
leads to prices being higher than efficient unit cost, both from pricing power 
and from the absence of incentives and market dynamics that require 
providers to reduce cost to the minimum.  Indeed, of all the fundamental 
problems in health markets, the absence of strong self-correcting 
mechanisms is the most troubling.  Entry and accurate quality information 
are theoretically (and often empirically) sufficient to improve most markets’ 
performance over time, but health markets and relationships with 
sympathetic  but self-interested, providers are so complex that credible 
information that less care can often be better care is not readily or widely 
accepted.  Instead, market “entry” of providers, or higher supply in more 
desirable locations (where income and life style opportunities are higher) 
has been shown time and time again to lead to supply-induced demand for 
certain kinds of preference-sensitive care.31  All these forces together lead to 
per capita health care cost growth which exceeds economy-wide productivity 
growth (and thus real income growth potential) by 2-3% per annum.32  Over 
time this is the main threat to middle class access to coverage and care (the 
uninsured now exceed 50 million and continue to grow)33 as well as the 
main structural imbalance in public budgets at the federal, state, and local 
levels.34  We cannot and should not be satisfied with health market 
performance in the status quo. 
IV.  POLICY TOOLS 
There are three types of tools available to policy makers to affect market 
performance: (1) competition-promotion, (2) regulation or structured 
competition, and (3) collaboration-facilitation.  The key question is not 
whether health markets actually satisfy the conditions of perfect competition.  
Few markets actually do, up close.  The relevant question is, can policy 
 
 30. Hoangmai H. Pham et al., Financial Pressures Spur Physician Entrepreneurialism, 
HEALTH AFF., Mar./ Apr. 2004 at 70, 79-80. 
 31. Fisher, supra note 29, at 286. 
 32. VICTOR R. FUCHS, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, POLICY BRIEF: THE 
FUTURE OF MANAGED CARE 2 (2000); see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM 
BUDGET OUTLOOK 35, 42 (2011) [hereinafter CBO LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK]. 
 33. CBO LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK, supra note 32, at 36. 
 34. Id. at 35, 43; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-496SP, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS’ FISCAL OUTLOOK 3 (Apr. 2011). 
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changes actually improve health market performance over the current status 
quo?  I answer this question for each set of tools in turn. 
A. Competition-promotion 
The concept of “first, do no harm,” at least as old as the Hippocratic 
Oath, should also be applied to policies governing health markets because 
many of the deviations from optimal performance are the fault of policy, 
law, and regulation, which often is the result of pursuing non-market goals 
with health policy tools that happened to be convenient.  The simplest 
competition-promoting policy to consider then is laissez-faire,35 which in the 
health care context entails reductions in regulation or legislative barriers to 
market freedom and competitive performance. 
There are at least three types of cases where more laissez-faire should 
be tried: 
When quality regulations are redundant and increase cost.  One 
example stems from lack of coordination of payers performing quality audits 
on hospitals.  A given hospital may be inspected on site by teams from 
Medicare, Medicaid, the U.S. Department of Defense, private insurers, the 
Joint Commission, as well as state, county and city governments, all looking 
for the very same quality and safety performance metrics.36  But each visit 
takes substantial documentation and senior-plus-mid-management time.37  
Coordination among quality regulators could save time, money, and 
improve quality by allowing senior management to devote more time to 
improving it rather than so much redundant time proving compliance with 
regulations. 
When the law itself is the barrier to efficiency.  The classic cases here are 
scope of practice restrictions that are not evidence-based.  The recent 
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) report on nursing compiled, yet again, the 
overwhelming evidence that nurse practitioners are perfectly capable of 
delivering very high percentages of the primary care needs of the general 
population, but many state legislatures, under pressure from local medical 
societies, refuse to grant scope of practice privileges commensurate with 
 
 35. Laissez-faire, literally “let do” in French, more generally is used by economists to 
mean free from policy intervention.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 954 (9th ed. 2009).  It is 
important to note, if only in passing, that no market activity is possible without a governmental 
authority defining and enforcing property rights and contracts, so the idea of “markets without 
government altogether” is a myth, however enduring and alluring it may be in some 
ideological camps. 
 36. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 159-94 (6th ed. 2008) (overviewing the 
different private and public entities that inspect hospitals). 
 37. See Eligibility for Hospital and Critical Access Hospital Accreditation, THE JOINT 
COMMISSION (Jan. 11, 2008), http://www.jointcommission.org/eligibility_hospital_cah_accred 
itation/. 
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their training and experience and the best available clinical evidence.38  This 
is also true for many other health professions, like psychologists, 
optometrists, nurse anesthetists, nurse midwives, pharmacists, etc.39 
Another example of far-from-perfect current law is patent law for 
pharmaceuticals.  Patents are unquestionably necessary to spur innovation, 
especially in markets where the innovation is knowledge, and therefore 
easily transferable once known.40 Without government-granted patent/ 
monopoly protection, there would be far less innovation than we observe 
today.  At the same time, granting a patent conveys monopoly power on the 
patent holder, so this raises prices and costs to others, necessitating a 
balance of competing interests, or a tradeoff.41  This is the main reason that 
in the United States, patent life is limited.  In 1995, patent life for all 
products was increased from seventeen to twenty years,42 but in PhRMA’s 
case, this is misleading, since the patent clock starts ticking when the 
intellectual properties of the new compound are filed, not when the drug is 
approved by the FDA for sale.43  The drug testing and then the formal FDA 
approval process, while necessary to assure efficacy and safety, can take 
eight to twelve years,44 which  shortens the effective patent life to twelve to 
eight years.  The shortened monopoly period to effectively recoup the costs 
of research and development and reward the investment and risk surely 
leads to higher brand name drug prices than might otherwise be the case.  
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman legislation attempted to balance the 
 
 38. INST. OF MED. (IOM), THE FUTURE OF NURSING: FOCUS ON SCOPE OF PRACTICE 2 
(2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2010/The-Future-of-
Nursing/Nursing%20Scope%20of%20Practice%202010%20Brief.pdf. 
 39. See REBECCA LEBUHN & DAVID A. SWANKIN, CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., REFORMING 
SCOPES OF PRACTICE 3, 4, 15 (2010), available at https://www.ncsbn.org/ReformingScopesof 
Practice-WhitePaper.pdf. 
 40. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY NO. 3, at 783, 787-88 (1987), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/2534454. 
 41. JEAN O. LANJOUW, ECON. GROWTH CTR., YALE UNIV., CTR. DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 775, 
THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN INDIA: “HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF 
THE POOR AND SUFFERING”?  4 (1997), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp 
775.pdf. 
 42. It had been set at seventeen years since Thomas Jefferson was president.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 154 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (demonstrating the change in U.S. patent life 
from seventeen to twenty years). 
 43. See MERRILL MATHEWS JR., INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, FROM INCEPTION TO 
INGESTION: THE COST OF CREATING NEW DRUGS (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://ipi.org/ipi/ 
IPIPublications.nsf/0/4a4dae090d22a1d886256c38005da8d9/$FILE/II-CostofnewDrugs-
3.pdf. 
 44. CAL. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ASS’N, FACT SHEET: NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, 
available at http://ca-biomed.org/pdf/media-kit/fact-sheets/CBRADrugDevelop.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2011). 
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competing objectives of encouraging new and more effective drugs with 
price competition from generics once patent protection expires, by allowing 
speedy approval of generics at the FDA while granting up to an additional 
five years of exclusivity—monopoly—to patent holders, once their patent 
had expired.45  Economic analysis suggests that this effectively extended the 
average effective life of drug patents by two to three years.46 
Furthermore, to extend the time of high profits accruing in the post-
approval patent protection period, name brand manufacturers have 
regularly filed nuisance lawsuits strategically near the time of patent 
expiration to challenge generic manufacturers’ products because the suit 
alone freezes FDA approval of generics for thirty months.47  In retaliation, 
generic manufacturers have countersued.48  Clearly, all this litigious effort 
could have been diverted to developing new drugs rather than fighting over 
the monopoly profits of old ones.  The ACA contribution to current drug 
monopoly law extended the Hatch-Waxman post-patent exclusivity period 
from five to twelve years for biologics,49 the most important class of new 
drugs in the twenty-first century, but promises to end the peri-expiration 
lawsuit games in as yet unspecified ways.50  This provision was the result of 
complicated political bargaining that, like the original Hatch-Waxman 
compromise, did not benefit from state-of-the-art unbiased economic 
analysis.51 
Optimal patent life is a relatively new area of research that is by no 
means settled into agreed upon and easily measurable formulae, but one 
 
 45. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1538, 1589, 1590 (1984). 
 46. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 
INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109 (2000). 
 47. Greater Access to Generic Drugs: New FDA Initiatives to Improve the Drug Review 
Process and Reduce Legal Loopholes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143545.htm; see CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS 
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 41 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftp 
docs/6xx/doc 655/pharm.pdf. 
 48. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: 
AN FTC STUDY 44 n.13 (July 2002) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrug 
study.pdf (outlining generic and brand name drug manufacturer patent suits). 
 49. ACA § 7002(a) (amending PHSA § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 50. ACA § 7002(c)(1) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)). 
 51. See Paul Blumenthal, The Legacy of Billy Tauzin: The White House-PhRMA Deal, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/02/ 
12/the-legacy-of-billy-tauzin-the-white-house-phrma-deal; Emily K. Strunk, Debate Over 
Exclusivity in Biologics Provision of PPACA Heats Up, HEALTH REFORM RES. CTR., AKIN GUMP 
STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, http://aghealthreform.com/2011/02/14/debate-over-exclusivity-
in-biologics-provision-of-ppaca-heats-up/ (last visited Oct. 4 2011). 
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overarching conclusion seems clear: effective patent length should be set 
based on technological and financial realities of individual markets, not 
“one length fits all” as under current law.  The post-ACA exclusivity period 
lengthens effective patent life for biologic pharmaceuticals back to and even 
beyond the twenty years of current U.S. patent law for all products except 
pharmaceuticals.52  It is hard to believe that this time frame appropriately 
balances our competing priorities of encouraging innovation and universal 
access to affordable high quality care.  Analytic re-examination of the rules 
for new and competing pharmaceutical approval and exclusivity would seem 
to be a public policy priority of the highest order. 
The third area where retreating from existing legal restrictions on market 
competition could improve market performance might be generally 
described as when emotion or nostalgia creates a protected class of 
providers.  Due to political pressure from rural members of Congress and a 
general sense that rural America needs and deserves federal help to sustain 
its unique way of life,53 Medicare has designated roughly 1300 rural 
hospitals as Critical Access Hospitals (“CAHs”),54 over 430 hospitals as sole 
community providers (“SCPs”)55 and 140 as Medicare dependent hospitals 
(“MDHs”).56  Any of these designations entitles the hospital to some form of 
cost-based reimbursement rather than prospective payment levels pegged to 
average degrees of efficiency across the hospital industry.57  These hospitals 
all have fewer than 100 beds (most fewer than twenty-five) and about 20% 
of them are more than thirty-five miles from alternative sources of 
emergency care.58  Since only about 20% of the US population still lives in 
rural areas, and some of them seek acute care in urban areas, these 
hospitals account for only 15% of Medicare’s total inpatient spending.59 
 
 52. ACA § 7002(g) (amending PHSA § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 53. See Council of Econ. Advisers, Strengthening the Rural Economy—The Current State 
of Rural America, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/fact 
sheets-reports/strengthening-the-rural-economy/the-current-state-of-rural-america (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2011). 
 54. Critical Access Hospitals Payment Systems, MEDPAC.GOV, http://www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_09_CAH.pdf (last updated Oct. 2009). 
 55. Sole Community Hospitals, TRICARE MGMT., http://www.tricare.mil/hospitalclassifica 
tion/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). 
 56. G. MARK HOLMES ET AL., N.C. RURAL HEALTH RES. & POL’Y ANALYSIS CTR., FINAL REP. NO. 
98, A COMPARISON OF RURAL HOSPITALS WITH SPECIAL MEDICARE PAYMENT PROVISIONS TO URBAN 
AND RURAL HOSPITALS PAID UNDER PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT 10 (2010); see also 42 C.F.R. § 
412.108 (2010). 
 57. Critical Access Hospitals Payment Systems Payment Basics, supra note 54. 
 58. Id.; see also 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.92, .108 (2010). 
 59. Census 2000 Population Statistics: U.S. Population Living in Urban vs. Rural Areas, 
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/census_issues/metropolitan_plan 
ning/cps2k.cfm (last visited October 17, 2011); A Data Book: Healthcare Spending and the 
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So why worry about such a small percentage of spending if it is basically 
serving another purpose as well, namely propping up rural economies and 
their desirability as places to live?  The short answer is because saving 10% 
or 20% off of the 15% of Medicare’s total inpatient spending would 
represent a large dollar amount of savings.  In addition, some rural 
hospitals are doing fine without the special payment rules, and for the 
others, excess Medicare payments alone do not guarantee financial stability 
or even survival for the smallest rural hospitals which are also threatened by 
uneven management of care processes and cash flow, low volumes of 
services, low payment from Medicaid and private providers, and 
uncompensated care.60  Quality of care in small, low volume hospitals is 
also a recurring concern.61  The better health policy would be to wean rural 
hospitals off cost-based Medicare reimbursement, which will force the ones 
which need help to form partnerships and referral arrangements with other 
hospitals and management teams who can help them transition to a service 
mix and business model that is sustainable, if possible.  Then a separate set 
of subsidy decisions should be made about ensuring an adequate degree of 
access to acute care for rural Americans.62  These are complex and 
ultimately social and political judgments, but the burden of keeping 
inefficient rural hospitals afloat should not fall to the Medicare program, or 
even to the overall health care system per se. 
Another competition-promotion policy to consider is antitrust.  The very 
purpose of the antitrust laws, if not the intent of every set of antitrust 
enforcers, is to protect and enhance consumer welfare from anti-competitive 
actions of individual sellers or groups of sellers acting in concert, which 
would lead to higher prices or lower quality than would occur under 
unrestrained competitive pressures.63  Thus, the sin in antitrust is generally 
some kind of restraint of trade or action which suppresses competition.  In 
practice in complex health markets, however, there has been relatively little 
success in applying antitrust remedies wisely, as a recent review of case law 
and scholarship shows: 
Case law has constrained enforcers’ ability to control concentration and has 
given overly permissive signals to providers who are contemplating further 
 
Medicare Program, MEDPAC.GOV, 80 (June 2010), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/jun 
10databookentirereport.pdf. 
 60. HOLMES, supra note 56, at 4, 20. 
 61. See AM. HOSP. ASSOC., THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR RURAL HOSPITALS IN 
AN ERA OF HEALTH REFORM 3, 7 (2010), available at www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/11apr-
tw-rural.pdf. 
 62. Having grown up in a town of 2,000 in a county of 10,000 in the Mississippi Delta, I 
am highly sympathetic, personally. 
 63. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law 
in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 185, 192. 
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consolidation.  Moreover, doctrine has developed erratically, failing to find 
a coherent approach to analyzing the complex nature of health care 
markets, and conveying the impression that decisions are more driven by 
outcomes than by sound analysis of precedent and economic policy.64 
There is nothing wrong with antitrust theory, but the truth is that basic 
research into the empirical implications of imperfectly competitive and multi-
product health markets is sorely needed.  This would give enforcers and 
jurists the analytic support they need for judgments about the relative 
likelihood of pro- or anti-competitive outcomes from joint ventures and 
mergers that are rampant now, in some ways driven by the incentive 
realignment strategies embedded in and emerging from the regulations 
pursuant to the ACA.  When antitrust law scholar Thomas Greaney writes: 
“What antitrust needs most, however, is sound economic and policy 
research,”65 then we must infer that antitrust policy cannot carry a heavy 
burden in correcting widespread market imbalances in the next few years.  
Even if we had first-rate analysis to rely on, the truth is that in many cases 
the underlying source of local market power for some hospitals—and 
sometimes for single specialty or large multi-specialty physician groups—
cannot be remedied effectively with traditional antitrust tools such as 
stopping a merger or a divestiture order.  This is because the hospital (or 
physician group) is likely to either be a de facto monopoly (natural or not) or 
have an outsized quality reputation, a form of product differentiation that is 
impossible or difficult to calibrate and divest. 
Antitrust policy, however, can be useful for very targeted, fact-driven 
purposes.  For example, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Michigan 
Attorney General recently filed a civil antitrust action against Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Michigan (“BCBSM”) alleging that some of its “Most Favored 
Nation” clauses in hospital contracts raise prices of consumers, by forcing 
hospitals to charge up to 40% more to other insurers than BCBCM pays 
them.66  Similarly, antitrust enforcement could be used to stop the anti-
competitive practice of device manufacturers who prevent hospitals from 
disclosing transaction prices to physicians.67  This has the effect of reducing 
 
 64. Id. at 193. 
 65. Id. at 194. 
 66. Complaint of United States of America and State of Michigan at 3, United States and 
Michigan v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 2:10-cv-14155-DPH-MKM (E.D. Mich. 
2010) available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f263200/263235.pdf; see also Jeffrey 
May, Health Insurer Sued Over Most Favored Nation Clauses, WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUS. 
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://antitrustconnect.com/2010/10/19/health-insurer-sued-over-most-fav 
ored-nation-clauses/. 
 67. Mark V. Pauly & Lawton R. Burns, Price Transparency For Medical Devices, 27 HEALTH 
AFF. 1544, 1551-52 (2008). 
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hospital bargaining power with device manufacturers, and clearly raises 
costs and reduces ultimate consumer welfare.68 
What are the most important other market imbalances, and what are 
other possible competition-promoting remedies?  The two cases mentioned 
as candidates for targeted antitrust enforcement suggest the class of 
imbalances, basically, whenever margins are large, whenever P is far above 
C*.  Insurers with dominant market shares, especially in the individual and 
small group market, can earn very hefty margins, or, in more technical 
terms, experience a low medical loss ratio (“MLR”) (percent of premium 
dollars spent on covered medical services).  The smaller the MLR, the more 
likely profits or margins are large relative to premium revenue collected.  A 
recent survey reported that 27% of small group insurers and 46% of non-
group insurers have MLRs lower than required in 2011 by the ACA.69  The 
difficulty is that competitive entry is not easy to engender in insurance 
markets, given the inherent advantages incumbent firms have in contracting 
with local providers.  This is especially true if they have achieved large 
market share and therefore bargaining power vis-a-vis hospitals (witness the 
MFN example from BCBSM)70 and the simultaneous ability to pay physicians 
high enough fees to discourage potential competitors from entry, which 
benefits physicians and insurers but harms consumers and others in local 
markets.  This is exactly why so many analysts supported a carefully 
structured public option health plan to jumpstart local insurance market 
competition where there is little today.71 
B. Structured Competition, Countervailing Buying Power and Targeted 
Regulation as Remedies 
It is important to note, if only in passing, that no market activity is 
possible without a governmental authority defining and enforcing property 
 
 68. Id. at 1545, 1552. 
 69. HEALTHSCAPE ADVISORS, LLC, MINIMUM MLR BENCHMARKING—HOW DOES YOUR PLAN 
STACK UP?, available at http://gallery.mailchimp.com/351e723f2128c004676ac2dcf/files/ 
HSA_MLR_Benchmarking_Quick_Sheet.2.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2011); see also Sara 
Hansard, 2010 Data Show Small Group, Individual Health Plans Would Have to Make 
Rebates, Health Ins. Rep. (BNA) (May 4, 2011), available at http://www.healthscapeadvi 
sors.com/articles/BNAMLRArticle.pdf. 
 70. May, supra note 66. 
 71. Competition in the Healthcare Marketplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot., Product Safety, and Ins. of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 
111th Cong. 85-99 (2009) (statement by Richard A. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of 
Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Len M. Nichols, Director, Health Policy Program, 
New America Foundation, David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action 
Fund, Mark Riley, National Treasurer, National Community Pharmacists Association, and 
Grace-Marie Turner, President, Galen Institute). 
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rights and contracts.  Thus, the idea of markets without government 
altogether is a myth, however enduring and alluring it may be in some 
ideological camps.  Policy is about setting market rules so that the self-
interest of market players furthers the social interest of agreed upon policy 
goals, as defined by politics.  Structured competition then is not about 
market manipulation, but about setting the rules of competition to move 
market performance closer to the competitive ideal, P = C*.  Remember, 
sellers prefer P > C. 
Alain Enthoven first articulated the idea of “managed competition.”72  
He was among the first market analysts and advocates to recognize that 
voluntary insurance markets as then (and currently) structured in the U.S. 
were never going to be able to deliver affordable coverage for all 
Americans.73  Assuming that affordable private insurance coverage for all is 
indeed the policy goal we share,74 insurance market rules will have to be 
changed so that aggressive underwriting and risk selection is no longer 
profitable.  This does not require putting insurers out of business or turning 
them into regulated utilities (though the MLR regulation provisions in the 
ACA come unnecessarily close to this result),75 but it does require changing 
the rules so that their business models will have to change to remain 
profitable.  Guaranteed issue,76 modified or full community rating,77 the end 
of pre-existing condition restrictions,78 an individual requirement to purchase 
insurance plus subsidies for the low-income and risk adjustment to 
 
 72. Alain C. Enthoven, History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 
1993 (Supp.), at 24, 29. 
 73. See id. at 42 (“A system of universal coverage will not work if everybody is covered, 
but only those who voluntarily choose to do so pay for it. Such a system would be destroyed by 
free riders.”). 
 74. This is the core issue, along with the metaphorical issue of competing theories of the 
proper role for government, animating the political struggles over the passage and 
implementation of the ACA. 
 75. See PHSA § 2718(a), added by ACA § 10101 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
18) (which requires insurers to submit a report including the percentage of total premium 
revenue, after accounting for collection or receipts for risk adjustment, risk corridors, and 
payments of reinsurance); see also Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio 
(MLR) Requirements under the Patient Protection Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,864, 
74,879, 74,886 (Dec. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 158). 
 76. See PHSA § 2702, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1) 
(ensuring guaranteed availability of coverage); see also PHSA § 2703, added by ACA § 1201 
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2) (ensuring guaranteed renewability of coverage). 
 77. See PHSA § 2701, added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg) 
(ensuring modified community rating). 
 78. See PHSA § 2704(a), added by ACA § 1201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg) 
(prohibiting insurers from excluded applicants based on preexisting conditions). 
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standardize the risk pools across insurers79 will largely accomplish the policy 
goal.  These new rules will channel or structure insurance market 
competition to focus more on price and quality and less on socially 
undesirable risk selection.  If implemented wisely and with appropriate 
subtlety, the ACA, which includes all of these conditions, should come close 
to accomplishing this. 
Other elements of structured competition in the ACA include 
“administrative simplification.”  Today, hospitals spend about 20% of 
revenue and physicians’ offices spend 30% of revenue on the administrative 
expense of getting paid,80 i.e., complying with the myriad claim forms and 
rules that insurers enforce idiosyncratically to compete on paying the fewest 
fraudulent claims.  Fraud has to be checked, of course, but the ACA uses 
federal regulation to set in motion a process of adopting standard claims 
adjudication algorithms, so that clinicians and hospitals can spend more 
resources on patient care.81  Competition over claims adjudication 
algorithms, assuming the standard method is reasonably good at weeding 
out fraudulent claims, is highly unproductive for the health care system as a 
whole—even if it may be profitable for individual insurers, which is exactly 
why they have always done it.  A structured competition approach will 
require all insurers to use the same algorithm, as the ACA does in 2016, 
and thereby will help focus competition into more socially productive 
avenues.82 
New market competition rules, administrative simplification, and 
medical loss ratio transparency83 will all usher in new insurer business 
models that will focus on competing by helping all enrollees find value in 
the health care system rather than by competing to exclude the largest share 
of sick enrollees or denying the largest share of claims filed.  Thus, insurers 
will have to focus on avoiding full body scans, medical arms races, and 
 
 79. See ACA § 1501 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (The ACA enacted individual 
mandate provision requiring most Americans to have health insurance coverage.); see also 
ACA § 1401 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 36) (covering subsidies for low-income individuals.); 
see also ACA § 1343 (to be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 18063) (covering risk adjustment.). 
 80. See HEALTHCARE ADMIN. SIMPLIFICATION COAL. (HASC), BRINGING BETTER VALUE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS THE COSTS AND CAUSES OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEXITY IN THE 
NATION’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 7 (2009), available at http://www.ahima.org/downloads/pdfs/ 
advocacy/HASCReport20090717.pdf (stating administrative costs account for an average of 
35% of healthcare spending, including 27% of spending at physician offices and 21% at 
hospitals.). 
 81. ACA § 1104 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2). 
 82. Id. 
 83. I would argue all that was necessary for good market results was for medical loss 
ratio transparency, not the specific regulatory levels of MLR required by the ACA.  However, it 
is the law as it now stands and so while it is overkill, the same result I focus on here will likely 
occur. 
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other volume-enhancing strategies of the past.  Insurers will also find it in 
their interest to pro-actively move away from unaccountable fee-for-service 
provider payment systems—and indeed, they already are.84  Thus structured 
competition in insurance markets will likely lead to more effective 
countervailing buying power in health service markets. 
But will private insurers have enough clout to counter provider market 
power at the local level?  They, and many commentators, fear not.85  This is 
why I and others think Medicare has to play a catalytic and collaborative 
role in exercising countervailing market power. Only Medicare has sufficient 
market share to make it worthwhile for providers to change their business 
models from health service maximization to health promotion and 
coordinating care.86  Insurers can help immensely by continuing value-
based design research, for value-based cost-sharing can align 
consumer/patient interests with payer and provider interests in an efficient 
and high-quality health care system.87 
Still, no one really thinks that even all of this will be enough to shift our 
health care cost growth trajectories to a sustainable slope soon enough to 
avoid much more fiscal and economic stress of the sort our national 
politicians have been arguing about lately.  In short, we have to pay China 
back for all the borrowing we have done,88 and that will require a cohesive 
 
 84. See, e.g., Michael E. Chernew et al., Private Payer Innovation in Massachusetts: The 
‘Alternative Quality Contract,’ 30 HEALTH AFF. 51, 51-52, 61 (2011) (discussing Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Massachusetts’s move from fee-for-service payment to an “Alternate Quality 
Contract,” which is modified global payment system); see also John E. Kralewski et al., The 
Effects of Medical Group Practice and Physician Payment Methods on Costs of Care, 35 
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 591, 608 (2000) (demonstrating how capitation payments are 
associated with lower costs to patients). 
 85. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows 
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 700-05 (2010) (discussing providers’ 
increasing market power to negotiate higher payment rates from private insurers in 
California); PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, RESEARCH BRIEF 
No. 16, WIDE VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF PROVIDER 
MARKET POWER, at 1, 1–2 (Nov. 2010). 
 86. Richard Kronick, Understanding the Medicare Financing Problem, in MAKING 
MEDICARE SUSTAINABLE 7 , 17–18 (Len M. Nichols & Robert A. Berenson, eds. 2009). 
 87. See A. Mark Fendrick & Michael E. Chernew, Value-based Insurance Design: Aligning 
Incentives to Bridge the Divide Between Quality Improvement and Cost Containment, 12 AM. 
J. MANAGED CARE (SPECIAL ISSUE) SP5, SP5 (2006) (stating value-based design insurance allows 
a focus on value of services, not cost or quality alone); see also Michael Chernew & A. Mark 
Fendrick, Value and Increased Cost Sharing in the American Health Care System, 43 HEALTH 
SERVICES RES. 451, 452 (2008) (noting that an ideal system would target copayments not 
based on the value of services, but patient groups who receive the value of services). 
 88. See Major Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt (last 
updated Nov. 16, 2011) (showing China is the top holder of American treasury securities). 
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and aggressive strategy of all of the above plus collaboration where 
necessary and feasible. 
C. Collaboration 
When is collaboration preferred to competition, even by economists?  
When no one knows the best way or technique, when there are large social 
payoffs from figuring it out quickly, and when the gains from collaboration 
are likely to greatly outweigh the net gains from competition.  Clearly, 
despite the incentive realignments created by the ACA and the related 
innovations spawned by the ACA in the private sector, no one really knows 
how to write down the math of the transition and the new business models 
for every stakeholder in the health care system today.  The scale of the 
necessary investments dwarfs the resources of most individual organizations. 
Investments are necessary in: (1) contracting expertise and templates for 
all actors in the health care system, from physician practices large and small 
to hospitals of all kinds; (2) measuring development for much larger units of 
services (many fewer than 8,000 CPT codes) and for the quality of those 
bundled services, (3) creating transparent databases that can support 
incentive realignment and efficient contracting, like all payer claims 
databases, health information exchanges of interoperable clinical data, and 
the specific elements of the medical loss ratio; (4) supporting consumer 
engagement strategies, including: wellness programs that motivate, value 
based insurance designs, and decision support systems that channel patient 
self-interest in an efficient and sustainable health care system to align with 
payer and provider interest; and (5) developing supple antitrust safe harbors 
that are also checks on excess market power so that optimal joint venture 
and accountability/reward sharing arrangements are worked out and 
spread. 
Collaboration and sharing come most naturally among entities that do 
not compete locally.  Since medicine is a profession with standards that are 
expected of all practitioners, standards that are constantly rising, the clinical 
medical literature is based on the premise that knowledge that advances 
patient outcomes and safety is a public good and should be shared so all 
clinicians and patients may benefit from it, not just the patients of the doctor 
that discovered the new modality.  The rewards that go with recognition for 
the discovery are presumed to be sufficient to preclude the need to hide the 
knowledge and be the only practitioner who performs the technique.  The 
collaborative investments outlined above may confer temporary competitive 
advantage to some stakeholders if they were successful alone, but our 
national sense of urgency to rein in health care cost growth is sufficiently 
great, and the likelihood of anyone squaring any of those circles quickly on 
their own is so low, that collaboration among public and private 
stakeholders is paramount at the present moment.  In many ways, this is the 
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effort that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation within CMS is 
trying to lead, but it is only going to succeed if a critical mass of private 
sector entities—hospitals, physicians, and health plans—embrace and 
engage in the collaborations and experiments needed. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article has outlined a set of positive roles for government policy to 
play in transforming the U.S. health care system.  It identifies clear cases in 
which, compared to the pre-ACA status quo, laisseiz-faire, regulation and 
collaboration are likely to substantially improve the performance of health 
service and insurance markets.  The ACA itself provides many tools that will 
clearly be helpful in creating a sustainable health system that serves almost 
all Americans better than they are served today.  At the same time, the 
complexities of incentive realignment are so great and our need for cost 
growth reduction so profound, that collaboration among public and private 
decision makers will be necessary as well, since the incentives that must be 
realigned must work for all payers, clinicians, and patients.  With the proper 
spirit of collaboration and investments, our health care system could serve 
all Americans and become sustainable within ten years.  This would satisfy 
both a moral and an economic imperative.  My contention in this article is 
that a wiser application of a broad set of economic policy tools can help us 
accomplish this common purpose.  The urgency of our task is such that we 
should, to the extent possible, dispense with political distractions and 
intensify this quest to the highest possible extent. 
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